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Abstract: We revisit the debate on Cournot and Bertrand profit comparison in a vertically 
related upstream market for inputs. We find that when an input pricing contract is determined 
through centralised bargaining, the final goods producers earn higher (lower) profit under 
quantity competition than under price competition if the goods are substitutes (complements). 
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1. Introduction 
In a seminal paper, Singh and Vives (1984) show that firms' profits are higher (lower) under 
Cournot compared to Bertrand competition when the goods are substitutes (complements) 
and the input markets are competitive. However, it is often found that input suppliers and the 
final goods producers are involved in vertical pricing contracts. Considering the input 
suppliers as labour unions López and Naylor (2004) argue that the standard profit ranking 
shown in Singh and Vives (1984) is reversed when a monopoly input supplier and two final 
goods producers determine input prices through decentralised bargaining process and the 
input suppliers place sufficient weight on wage (input price) determination. Using a model of 
two-part tariff vertical pricing contract where the input supplier and the final goods producers 
involve in decentralised bargaining, Alipranti et al. (2014) further confirms the results of 
López and Naylor (2004).1  
While the assumption of decentralised bargaining process is a useful starting point, 
it is equally intriguing to investigate whether the results alluded above hold when the input 
price contract constitutes centralised bargaining. The implication of centralised bargaining is 
justifiable in most continental European countries, such as Germany (Hirsch et al. (2014)). In 
the context of strategic input-price determination Calmfors and Driffill (1998), Danthine and 
Hunt (1994) argue that collective bargaining is more widely accepted as it internalises 
various negative externalities, such as unemployment. In light of this, we consider a model 
where the downstream firms involve in centralised bargaining with an upstream input 
supplier to determine the equilibrium input price. In contrast to the existing results on vertical 
pricing models, we show that the final goods producers earn a higher (lower) profit under 
Cournot structure than Bertrand when the goods are substitutes (complements) thus 
supporting the findings of Singh and Vives (1984). 
 
1
 See López (2007), Mukherjee et al. (2012), Basak and Wang (2016) for related works on strategic input-price 
determination.  
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2. The model 
We consider an economy with two downstream firms, denoted by Di producing differentiated 
products where       and    . The downstream firms require a critical input for 
production that they purchase from a monopoly input supplier, U at a per unit price iw which 
is determined through generalised centralised Nash Bargaining. U produces the inputs at a 
constant marginal cost of production,  	 
 . We assume that one unit of input is required 
to produce one unit of the output, and  and   can convert the inputs to the final goods 
without incurring any further cost.  
We develop a model of two stage game. At stage 1, U involves in a centralised 
bargaining with a representative of 1D  and 2D  to determine the price of the critical input, iw , 
   . At stage 2, 1D  and 2D compete either in quantities (Cournot competition) or in 
prices (Bertrand competition) and the profits are realised. We solve the game through 
backward induction. 
 
 3. Equilibrium outcomes 
We assume that a representative consumer's utility function is given by 
                
 
where  is the numeraire good and q denotes the final good produced by the downstream 
firm. The parameter  	 
 measures the degree of product differentiation. If    the 
goods are substitutes and if    the goods are complements.  
Using eq(1) we obtain downstreams' inverse and direct demand functions respectively 
        !   
         " 
Next, we derive the equilibrium outcomes contingent to the game structure discussed earlier.  
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 3.1 Cournot competition 
We begin with the case where the downstream firms compete in quantities. Downstream 
firm's profit motive yields 
#$%&' ()       * 
 
Solving the first order conditions we obtain the equilibrium output of the ith firm 
)  
    *  *   
+ 
Given (3), the profit equation in (2) reduces to ()  ). 
Next we turn our analysis to stage 1 where the input prices are determined. To this 
extent we consider two types of price setting behaviour of the upstream firm - (i) uniform 
pricing and (ii) discriminatory pricing. In case of uniform pricing the upstream firm 
maximises ,()  
*   ∑   with respect to w whereas it maximises ,() 
∑ 
*    with respect to * if input pricing is discriminatory. Our modelling is similar to 
right-to-manage model.2 We assume that the input price determination is an outcome of 
generalised Nash bargaining3: 
*)  ./ 0,()  ,(1 2 3()  (1  4
5627
8 
where ,(1  and (1  are the disagreement pay-offs of the upstream and downstream firms 
respectively. We assume that in the event of disagreement the downstream firms stop 
producing which entails zero reservation pay-offs for both input suppliers and final goods 
producers. The parameter 9 (respectively   9) measures the relative bargaining power of 
the input supplier (respectively final goods producers). A higher (lower) value of  
 

The right-to-manage model has gained more popularity in the policy circle compared to efficient bargaining 
model. See Oswald (1993) and Layard (1991) who offered some arguments in favour of this issue.
3
 See Serrano (2008a, b) for a survey on Nash bargaining. 
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corresponds to a higher (lower) bargaining power of the input supplier. At the extreme, if 
9  , the input supplier has full bargaining power, and if 9   the downstream firms have 
full bargaining power. We restrict our analysis to 9 	 
. 
Maximising (4) we obtain the equilibrium input price as *)  5 
9  9   
both under uniform and discriminatory price setting.4  
We derive the downstream and upstream profits as 
()  :
  
  9
   ;
 $<=,()  9
  
  9
   
> 
The consumer surplus and social welfare ( ?@  @  ,() are 
?@)  
  
  9
  8
    
$<=@A)  
  
  9
B  9    98
   
B 
 
3.2 Bertrand competition 
Now, we consider the situation where the downstream firms compete in prices and repeat the 
same exercise as in section 3.1. Downstream firms maximise the following 
#$%C' (D 
  * EF
56G6C'HGCI56GJ K
L                           
The equilibrium price and output of the ith firm can be found as5 
 

In discriminatory input price setting, the negotiation between U and the two downstream firms could be such 
that U charges an exorbitantly high input price to one of the downstream firms that it becomes inactive and the 
other downstream firm produces like a monopolist. Straightforward calculations show that by charging *) MF
N6GH2GHO
62GN  and *D M FN6GH2G6GJHO
62G
6GJ  under Cournot and Bertrand competition respectively, U 
can oust away one of the downstream firms and let the other downstream firm to produce like a monopolist. The 
upstream profit, in this situation, becomes 2
F6OJ
62P   which is lower than ,() in eq(5) and,(D in eq(9). As 
U behaves opportunistically and always maximises its profit, our main focus remains on the duopoly case. 
 

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D  
  
    
  *  *8    
D  
  
    
  *  *
  
8   
Q 
Given the above, downstream's profit maximisation problem in (7) reduces to (D 

  
D.  
Substituting the equilibrium output levels and profit levels in (4) and differentiating 
the expression with respect to w (in case of uniform pricing) and * (in case of discriminatory 
pricing) we get the equilibrium input price as *D  5 
9  9  .  
The net equilibrium profits of iD  and U are 
(D  
  
  9
  8
  
   $<=,(D  9
  
  9
  
   
R 
The consumer surplus and social welfare are 
?@D  
  
  98
  
   
$<=@AD  
  
  9
B  9  88
  
   
 
 
Corollary 1: The equilibrium input price under Bertrand competition is identical to that of 
Cournot competition. 
The rationale for this result follows from Dhillon and Petrakis (2000), who show 
that, if the input supplier’s objective function is log-linear in input prices and if bargaining 
takes place over wages alone (also holds in our case), the equilibrium wage rate is 
    
5
 It is noteworthy that if  is close to unity and *5  *, then firm 1 may have an incentive charge 
*  S 
where T   and raise its profit while firm 2 sells nothing. Thus, there exists a unique equilibrium (albeit in a 
limiting sense) where firm 1 charges 5  . 
* U where the monopoly price 
U is FHVJ  and we simply 
use *  in place of 
*  T  while it is understood that firm 1 serves the entire market. As the firms are 
symmetric in nature, analogous argument holds for firm 2. In a more trivial case, where *5  *  *,  both 
firms will produce F6V  by pricing the marginal cost.        
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independent of several market features, such as the number of firms, the degree of product 
differentiation and the intensity of market competition. The input supplier charges the same 
input price under Cournot and Bertrand competition, as its profit motive solely depends on 
the industry labour demand and hence, market output. Due to its monopoly nature, the 
upstream firm appropriates a larger profit via higher industry output that arises due to a rise in 
intensity of product market competition (see Proposition 1). Note that, the input price effect6 
under decentralised bargaining discussed in López and Naylor (2004) disappears in our 
analysis. 
4. Results 
We summarise our main results in the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 1: If    the downstream firms earn higher (lower) profits under Cournot 
competition than under Bertrand competition when the goods are substitutes (complements) 
whereas the upstream profit is strictly higher under Bertrand competition. 
Proof: See that W(  ()  (D  GX
F6OJ
62J
5HG
N6GJJ  where W(   for  	 
 and W(   
for  	 
. And, ,()  ,(D   2GJ
F6OJ
62
5HG
N6GJ   for ( 1,1).γ ∈ −  
The input price (read as marginal cost) being identical under Cournot and Bertrand 
competition, the reasoning behind downstream firm's profit ordering in our analysis, is 
similar to that of Singh and Vives (1984), i.e., competition being less fierce under Cournot 
competition compared to Bertrand competition7, the former competition generates higher 
(lower) downstream profits when the goods are substitutes (complements). 
 

 López and Naylor (2004) argue that the labour demand being less elastic under Cournot than under Bertrand 
competition, the firm-specific input suppliers charge a higher input price in the former case than the latter. 

Check that)  D  GJ
F6O
62
N6GJ  $<=)  D   GJ
F6O
62
N6GJ
5HG  "
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The upstream profit, on the other hand, depends on the market output. A higher 
output level under Bertrand competition offers greater opportunity to the upstream firm to 
extract rent. Hence, the input supplier reaps higher profit under Bertrand competition than 
under Cournot. 
 
Proposition 2: If 0γ ≠ Bertrand competition yields higher consumer surplus and social 
welfare than Cournot competition.  
Proof: Check that ?@)  ?@D  GJ
F6OJ
62JGJ6G6NN
N6GJJ
5HG    and @A)  @AD 
 GJ
F6OJ
62PHN26NGH2G6GJ62GJN
N6GJJ
5HG  . 
As follows from Proposition 1, downstream firms charge a higher market price under 
Cournot than under Bertrand competition. This serves as a negative externality to the 
consumers and creates lower consumer surplus under the former competition. 
Again, we find that the loss in upstream profit and consumer surplus under Cournot 
competition is so severe that it outweighs the gains from producers surplus when the goods 
are substitutes. The comparison is straightforward if the goods are complements. Hence, 
social welfare under Cournot competition is strictly lower than Bertrand competition as 
traditional in the literature.  
Clearly, Proposition 1 and 2 collapse when   i.e., when the type of competition 
becomes irrelevant. 
Allowing a centralised generalised Nash bargaining between the input supplier and 
the final goods producers, we show that the net profits of the final goods producers are higher 
(lower) under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition when the goods are 
substitutes (complements). Our findings contradict the existing results in vertical pricing 
models. 
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